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1 Introduction
Reconciling work and family life is a key issue in recent policy debates (OECD, 2007).
Childbirth is associated with a strong reduction in female employment right after birth,
which in a life-cycle perspective has adverse eects on later labor market outcomes
(OECD, 2002; Ondrich et al., 1999; Schonberg and Ludsteck, 2012). Decisions about
career objectives and about starting a family have to be taken jointly { usually between
the age of 20 and 40 years. Many Western countries exhibit a combination of low fertility
rates and low female labor market participation rates, which poses great challenges for
future economic development. There has been a lively discussion as to whether mothers
in the U.S. increasingly "opt-out" of the labor market, although there is no clear evi-
dence for such a trend (Goldin, 2006; Fortin, 2009). Empirical estimates of the eects of
motherhood on subsequent employment have to address the selection into motherhood.
Our paper contributes to this literature, rst, by suggesting and implementing a dynamic
treatment approach to estimate the eect of having the rst child now versus later on fu-
ture employment. Second, we study the case of Germany, a country with a long maternity
leave coverage (Schonberg and Ludsteck, 2012).
A large literature estimates the causal eects of birth on subsequent employment of
mothers by means of dierent identication strategies. Earlier quasi-experimental studies
for the U.S. estimate the labor supply eects in response to an increase in the number
of children (Bronars and Grogger, 1994; Angrist and Evans, 1998).1 In a more recent
study, Cristia (2008) estimates the eect of a rst child exploiting the quasi-experimental
variation in fertility among women who seek help to become pregnant. There also exists
a large literature on the negative eects of having children on mothers' wages. Waldfogel
(1998a,1998b) identies as the main reason for large wage losses the long employment
breaks after childbirth associated with employer changes. For the UK, Millimet (2000)
estimates a causal eect with a simultaneous model using a covariance restriction as identi-
fying strategy. Ejrnaes and Kunze (2012) and Schonberg and Ludsteck (2012) use German
policy reforms to investigate the causal eect of births on female wages in Germany.
In an approach, which is more closely related to our study, Simonsen and Skipper
(2006) match nonparametrically mothers and non-mothers for Denmark based on observ-
able exogenous covariates based on register data. The study estimates the wage costs of
motherhood. The authors account for the eects of motherhood on some observable char-
acteristics and distinguish between the direct eect holding these characteristics constant
1Bronars and Grogger (1994) use the fact of having twins in the rst birth to instrument having a
second child. Angrist and Evans (1998) exploit the preference for mixed-sex siblings in order to estimate
the preference having more than two children.
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and the indirect eects operating through the changes in these characteristics. Most of
the wage costs of motherhood are found to operate through the indirect eects.
While the aforementioned studies provide evidence on the negative eect of childbirth
versus not having a child on subsequent labor market outcomes, these studies do not
address the question of timing of birth. Given that a large share of women is giving birth
to a child at some point in their lives and that women are taking important career decisions
at the same time in life, various studies in the literature analyze the timing of childbirth.
Miller (2011), Wilde et al. (2010), and Troske and Voicu (2010, 2012) investigate the
eects of timing of rst birth on labor supply and wages of mothers in the U.S.. Although
dierent estimation methods and identication strategies are applied, our paper is closely
related to this literature.
Troske and Voicu (2011, 2012) use a complex semi-structural ve-equation model to
analyze the eect of timing and spacing of births on employment by estimating a multi-
nomial probit model for dierent employment states (full time, part time, etc) and, si-
multaneously, a probit model for the fertility decision. The advantage of this approach is
the simultaneous modeling of labor supply and fertility decisions. Identication is mainly
driven by including the number of children of the mother's siblings. However, this identi-
cation strategy requires a tight specication of the timing of the decision process. Fur-
thermore, the empirical analysis is restricted to the selective sample of married women
who have a rst child after marriage. The estimated model contrasts the employment
outcome of mothers with the employment outcome of childless women. Troske and Voicu
(2012) nd that delaying the rst birth leads to higher levels of labor market involvement
before the birth of the rst child and reduces the negative employment eects after birth.
Troske and Voicu (2010) emphasize the strong persistence of labor market states, there-
fore enhancing the lasting negative eects of childbirth on employment. The study also
nds strong eect heterogeneity of birth with respect to observables and unobservables.
Miller (2011) and Wilde et al. (2010) estimate the eect of higher age at rst birth on
subsequent labor market outcomes, using women who have a child at a later age as the
control group for women who have a child at an earlier age (see also Herr (2009, 2011)
for related studies). Miller (2011) instruments age at rst birth by naturally occuring
fertility shocks. The study nds that delaying rst birth increases employment and wages
after birth. The eects are strongest for women with a college degree and for those in
professional and managerial occupations. Wilde et al. (2010) criticize the instruments
used by the former study, especially with regard to the lack of exogeneity in case of time-
varying instruments and to measurement error problems. Instead, they use characteristics
of parents or events having occured at an early age to instrument the age at rst birth.
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The study also nds that delaying rst birth improves earnings after birth. Wilde et al.
(2010) and Miller (2011) explore how the wage and career consequences of motherhood
dier by skill and timing. Wage trajectories diverge sharply for high-skilled women after
they have children (but not before), while there is little change for low-skilled women.
The higher career costs of childbirth may account for the greater tendency of high-skilled
women to delay birth or to avoid having a child altogether. Correspondingly, Miller (2011)
nds that delaying birth shows a stronger positive eect for high-skilled women compared
to less-skilled women.
Why is the case of Germany interesting? As in many countries, the political debate
in Germany focuses on the joint nature of fertility and employment decisions. In light
of the long maternity leave coverage of 36 months of job-protected leave, there has been
growing concern that mothers do not return to their job and that their careers are actually
negatively aected by such long employment interruptions. Over time, social norms seem
to have changed, now favoring employment of mothers with young children, and policy
changes to allow for a reconciliation of employment and family tasks are asked for. Firms
take eorts to balance work and family roles, fathers have increased their involvement in
informal childcare, and the availability of formal childcare for children below the age of
three has increased strongly. Policy makers implemented a policy reform in 2001 providing
nancial incentives for an earlier return-to-job after childbirth and fostering part time work
when the child is still young. Another reform was implemented in 2007 with the intent
to foster female labor supply as well as fertility.
Until now little is known about the magnitude of longitudinal employment losses after
rst childbirth in Germany and their changes over a longer time period accounting for
dierences by age and skill group. Most of the existing studies for Germany analyze the
impact of policy changes in maternity leave coverage.2 Ondrich et al. (1996, 2003) and
Schonberg and Ludsteck (2012) nd that increases of the maximum duration of maternity
leave between 1986 and 1992 led to a successive rise in the duration of employment
interruptions.3 Bergemann and Riphahn (2011) and Kluve and Tamm (2012) nd that the
2007 reform which increased considerably the income support for the rst year of parental
leave, while cutting it for the second and third year led to a shift in the employment
patterns of mothers during the rst three years after birth. During the rst 12 months the
employment rates decline, while after 12 months the employment rates increase. Kluve and
Tamm (2012) and Schonberg and Ludsteck (2012) estimate causal eects by applying a
2Strictly speaking, Germany provides parantal leave coverage. However, until the mid 2000s parental
leave is typically taken by female workers.
3A similar result is found by Lalive and Zweimuller (2009) for Austria and by Baker and Milligan
(2008) for Canada.
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regression discontinuity design. The advantage of this approach is the random assignment
of the treatment, as couples can hardly plan the exact timing of birth and did not know
about the reform at the time of conception. However, one may be concerned about the
external validity of these results in light of the possibility that individuals adjust their
behavior over time when an institutional change is associated with changes in social norms
(see Fortin, 2009, for the importance of gender role attitudes).
As the opportunity costs of childbirth vary with acquired human capital, e.g. higher
work experience or education, the timing of rst birth has an important impact on future
career outcomes (Miller, 2011; Wilde et al., 2010; Troske and Voicu, 2009). Put dierently,
women of a certain age decide whether to have a child now or wait { with the expected
negative career eects varying by age. This raises two questions to be addressed by
our study: 1) Does the timing of rst birth have an impact on post-birth employment in
Germany? 2) Is this impact in line with human capital theory, i.e. is the negative treatment
eect weaker for women with more human capital? Our analysis recognizes that post-
birth employment behavior aects future employment chances since longer breaks and
lower working hours reduce the amount of human capital (Lefebvre et al., 2009; Beblo
and Wolf, 2002). Clearly, the employment behavior in the rst years after childbirth
depends on the private environment, institutions (for instance availability of childcare, see
Kreyenfeld and Hank, 2000; van Ham and Buchel, 2004), but also on pre-birth employment
and education. Furthermore, the fertility decision is based on the expected employment
chances after childbirth. On the one hand, women with higher human capital or higher
labor force attachment have the most to lose from an employment break in terms of human
capital and, thus, career opportunities (Troske and Voicu, 2009; Miller, 2011). We would
therefore expect older and more educated rst-time mothers to catch up more quickly to
the control group than younger or less educated rst-time mothers. On the other hand,
older rst-time mothers may have had a successful career already, which might increase
the employment loss caused by the birth of a rst child. Thus, the direction of how the
employment eect of rst childbirth among the women having a rst child varies with age
is an empirical question.
Out paper implements a dynamic treatment eect approach, which does not require
a complete modelling of the fertility and labor market decisions. We estimate the causal
eect of rst childbirth on female employment over the course of ve years after birth.
Our empirical analysis uses data on rst childbirth between the age of 24 and 33 from
the GSOEP for the time period 1991 to 2008, as the GSOEP provides not only detailed
monthly information on employment, but also a large set of control variables (including
information on the partner and on attitudes towards family).
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Our estimation approach has been used before to estimate the eect of active la-
bor market policies (Sianesi, 2004, 2008; Fitzenberger et al., 2013) in a situation, where
nontreated individuals today may be treated in the future. This approach also draws
on Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) and Lechner (2009), and is linked to the timing-
of-events approach of Abbring and van den Berg (2003). We address the selection into
childbirth by contrasting rst-time mothers with highly comparable women who display
a similar propensity to have a rst child soon. This comparison is based on reduced-form
estimates of the propensity to have a rst child at a certain time and age. We assume
that individuals decide whether to have a child now or wait. After conditioning on labor
market history and personal characteristics, the exact timing of birth is assumed random,
which is the basis of our identication strategy. We cannot estimate the causal eect of
having a child versus never having a child or of having a child at a higher age versus at a
lower age (delay childbirth). Conditioning on not giving birth in the future or condition-
ing on given birth in the future at a certain age would result in a highly selective control
group. The literature addresses this problem by using quasi-experimental variation in the
data or by fully modelling the selection on unobservables. Instead, our approach allows
control individuals to either have a child later or to never have a child. We align treated
and control individuals dynamically by age, and we match treated and controls using
inverse probability weighting (IPW) with weights normalized to sum up to one (Busso
et al., 2009). Finally, we employ ex-post outcome regressions (Abadie and Imbens, 2011)
to analyze the heterogeneity of the estimated employment eects. Note that, in contrast
to most of the literature discussed for Germany, we do not use a policy reform as ex-
ogenous variation to identify the causal eect of childbirth on employment. However, we
investigate to what extent the estimated eect changes over time, possibly in response to
changing social norms towards employment of mothers.
Our results show a sharp decline in employment around childbirth. The average treat-
ment eect on the treated slowly converges to zero, implying that employment rates
recover as the child grows older. However, we also show that within the observation pe-
riod of ve years, the estimated average treatment eects on the treated do not level o.
As expected from human capital theory, the employment loss is lower for mothers with
a university degree. It is especially high for medium-skilled mothers with long pre-birth
employment experience. We nd a signicant reduction in the employment loss for more
recent childbirths.
The paper proceeds as follows. The institutional background in Germany is described
in section 2. Section 3 develops the econometric approach and section 4 describes the
data used. The empirical results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background
Maternity leave coverage in Germany, which provides employment protection after child-
birth, was extended to three years in the early 1990s, which is very generous in inter-
national comparison (OECD, 2002; Schonberg and Ludsteck, 2012). However, there is
concern that the long maternity leave coverage is one of the reasons for the low employ-
ment rates of German mothers (OECD, 2002; Schonberg and Ludsteck, 2012; Ondrich
et al., 1999). As a result, the German government changed the rules that regulate income
support during maternity leave in 2001 and in 2007 in order to increase the incentive for
mothers to return to their jobs sooner.4
Two dierent laws govern maternity leave coverage (Kreyenfeld, 2001; Schonberg and
Ludsteck, 2012), both of which concern the job protection and the regulation of nancial
benets, but apply to dierent time periods. The "Maternity Protection Law" (Mutter-
schutzgesetz) requires a pregnant woman to temporarily stop working six weeks before
and eight weeks after birth in order to protect her and the baby's health.5 During this
period, the mother receives her full net labor income which is nanced partly by the
employer and partly by the health insurance.
The "Parental Leave Law" (Elternzeitgesetz) regulates the job protection period and
the income assistance during the parental leave period.6 The job protection involves the
right to return to a comparable job at the previous employer, but this does not necessarily
have to be exactly at the same workplace as before birth. The job protection period is three
years of which up to twelve months may be delayed until the child reaches the age of eight.
Eects of the extensions of maternity leave coverage from the 1970s to the early 1990s on
children outcomes are analyzed by Dustmann and Schonberg (2012). According to the
"Parental Leave Law", parental benets are paid only if the parent on leave does not work
4The 2007 reform has received more attention in the public debate compared to the 2001 reform.
In particular, the income support was changed from a means-tested at transfer to a transfer which is
proportional to the earnings before birth (up to a maximum level of Euro 1800) during the rst year after
birth. After 2007, all employed mothers are eligible for this new transfer and the level of the transfer
is much higher. At the same time, the transfer was limited to a time period of 12 months. The 2007
reform also stipulates that the period with income support can be extended to 14 months if both parents
take at least 2 months of maternity leave. Two goals of the reform were to (i) increase the incentives for
employed fathers to take part of the maternity leave and to share the child care with the mother and (ii)
help women to combine work and family and therefore allow for a quicker return to the job after birth.
5The post-birth break is mandatory whereas for the pre-birth period, women can apply for an exemp-
tion. In the case of giving birth to twins the after-birth period is extended to twelve weeks.
6Parents can share paternity leave coverage and the cumulated leave periods can amount to at most
three years. Thus, the maximum leave period for fathers is three years minus maternity protection after
birth.
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more than the allowed amount of hours, lives in the same household and predominantly
cares for the child by him- or herself. Before 2001, a parent on parental leave had been
allowed to work at most 19 hours a week. In January 2001, this upper bound was extended
to 30 hours. In addition, the parent on leave { if eligible{ was given the right to choose
between receiving 300 Euro per month during the rst 24 months or 450 Euro per month
during the rst 12 months. This should provide incentives for a return-to-job after 12
or 24 months. The maternity benet was means-tested, i.e. it was paid to families with
an annual net income less than 30,000 Euro in two-parent households and 23,000 Euro
in single-parent households. Six months after birth these boundaries decreased to 16,500
(13,500) Euro plus 3,140 Euro for each additional child. Furthermore, families receive a
monthly child allowance (Kindergeld) for dependent children of today 184 Euro for the
rst and second child, 190 Euro for the third child and 215 Euro for all further children.
Table 1 shows the development of the child allowance during our observation period. As
an alternative, families can choose a tax exemption for dependent children, which is more
attractive for high income families. Moreover, at exactly the same date as the reform
discussed so far (January 2001), there was another political reform which facilitated part
time work, regardless of having children or not. The latter reform established a legal claim
for part time work and regulated xed term contracts ("Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz").
[ Table 1 about here. ]
Working mothers also need formal or informal childcare for their children. In 2007,
around 14 percent of all children under the age of three attended formal or institutional
childcare (Muhler, 2010). The coverage is 37 percent in East Germany and only 8 percent
in West Germany. In West Germany, the availability of formal childcare for children
under the age of three has been growing slowly over time, starting from a very low level.
From age three on, every child in Germany is entitled to formal institutional childcare in
kindergarten. For this age group, the attendance rate amounts to 89 percent. However,
the opening hours in most of the existing childcare facilities are often not sucient (Boll,
2009) and attendance is often only on a part time basis. The lack of suitable formal
childcare is often viewed as an obstacle for higher employment levels among mothers of
young children in Germany.
3 Econometric Approach
Our goal is to estimate the average treatment eect for the treated (ATT) on employment
based on discrete time data. The treatment is 'rst childbirth at a certain age' against
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the alternative of waiting. The alternative of waiting, i.e. of not having a rst childbirth
now, entails both the possibility of never having a child and the possibility of having a
child at a later age. This treatment eect has been suggested by Sianesi (2004, 2008) in
the context of estimating the eects of active labor market programs. Note that we do
not estimate the treatment of having a rst child now versus never having a child in life.
We assume a dynamic conditional independence assumption (a sequential randomiza-
tion assumption) and apply inverse probability weighting (IPW) based on the estimated
propensity score (Hirano et al., 2003; Lechner, 2009). Following Busso et al. (2009), we
implement the IPW estimator for the ATT by normalizing the weights of the members
in the comparison group to sum up to one. Because our control group changes by age
at rst birth and since there is attrition in the control group over time, the normaliza-
tion of weights changes along the two dimensions 'age at rst birth' and 'elapsed time
since birth'. We summarize the ATT estimates and analyze eect heterogeneity using
weighted outcome regressions as suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2011) for matching
estimators. The next subsection introduces and motivates the treatment parameter to
be estimated (section 3.1). Section 3.2 then describes our implementation of the IPW
estimator. Finally, we introduce the weighted outcome regression based on IPW (section
3.3).
3.1 Dynamic Treatment Approach
The treatment eect that we estimate is the eect of treatment versus waiting, as intro-
duced by Sianesi (2004, 2008). Thus, for a certain age, we estimate the ATT of having
a rst child at this age versus not having a child at this age. The group of nontreated
women consists both of women who never have a child and who have a child at a later age.
This denition of the control group avoids conditioning on future outcomes. Treated and
nontreated women at a certain age did not have a child before the considered age. Fur-
thermore, we match treated and nontreated women by observable characteristics twelve
months before birth.
The treatment eect we estimate is an example for the dynamic treatment approach
applied in the context of program evaluation of active labor market policies by Sianesi
(2004, 2008) for Sweden or by Fitzenberger et al. (2013) for Germany. These countries
have a comprehensive system of active labor market policies implying that with some
probability, unemployed individuals who have not been treated by a certain point of time
may receive treatment later. If one constructs a control group based on individuals who
are not treated during the observation window, one runs the risk of conditioning on future
outcomes as, for example, individuals will not participate in treatment in the future if they
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have found a job before. Put dierently, individuals who are eligible for treatment at a
certain point of time but receive treatment later would be excluded from the control group.
The exit from unemployment to employment and the entry into program participation
are two competing risks, and unobserved characteristics are typically correlated with the
chances of nding a job (quickly) as well as with program participation. Correspondingly,
Sianesi (2004, 2008) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) argue that excluding future
participants from the control group would lead to biased estimates of the treatment eect
due to selection on unobservables.
The key identication assumption for our analyis is a dynamic conditional indepen-
dence assumption (a sequential randomization assumption) stating that conditional on
the variables controlled for until a certain time period the assignment to treatment in
this time period is random, i.e. independent of the potential outcomes. To estimate
the ATT, it suces to assume conditional independence of assignment with the potential
non-treatment outcome. A key threat to identication would be the anticipation of actual
treatment in the future, which would entail the risk of conditioning on future treatment
by conditioning on past outcomes.
Our application of the dynamic treatment approach is comparable to the training
literature example insofar as the control group remains childless up to the considered point
in time (similar to unemployed individuals remaining jobless and/or without training).
This highlights the importance of avoiding conditioning on future outcomes. Therefore,
in our application, for women giving birth for the rst time at a certain age, we do not
exclude the alternative of giving rst birth at a later age. This corresponds to the dynamic
nature of fertility decisions, which are taken jointly with career decisions. As Ciliberto
et al. (2012, p. 10) put it "[...] employees make their fertility choices many times in their
lives [...]". Using solely a control group of women who do not give rst birth until a much
later age or who will never have a child would bias the control group towards women with
a low propensity of having a child. This is due to selection into motherhood.7 This bias is
likely to be correlated with labor market outcomes (e.g. women with a strong unobserved
career orientation are more likely to exhibit a higher labor market attachment and lower
fertility rates).8 The endogeneity problem of fertility and employment also arises due to
potential labor market shocks and shocks related to personal circumstances (relationships,
7A number of studies use non-mothers for comparison and this way include selection into motherhood
in the estimated eect (Ejrnaes and Kunze, 2012; Fernandez-Kranz et al., 2013; Simonsen and Skipper,
2006).
8The underlying reason for this type of endogeneity is that both fertility and career are controlled by
women (at least in part, see Troske and Voicu, 2010). For dierent approaches to address endogeneity in
this context, see Miller (2011), Herr (2009, 2011), Gustafsson et al. (1996), and Wilde et al. (2010).
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household characteristics), with dierential eects on fertility and labor market outcomes.
It is plausible that positive labor market shocks are negatively correlated with future
fertility or that personal shocks, which reduce the fertility in the future, are also correlated
with labor market outcomes.9 For the purpose of our analysis, these eects are similar in
nature to the competing risks approach prevalent in the timing-of-events analysis of active
labor market policies. Therefore, the results would be biased if we excluded women who
give rst birth later (Wilde et al., 2010). This argument assumes that we cannot control
unobserved heterogeneity of the treated women if we merely consider nontreated women
who do not give birth in the future. Instead we follow Sianesi (2004, 2008) and assume
that women giving birth to their rst child are comparable before the gestation lag, i.e.
at the time before pregnancy, to women who do not give birth at a certain point in time,
i.e. at a certain age. This approach assumes that women do not know the exact timing
of rst birth before the gestation period. But they may know the probability of having a
rst birth now versus later and they may act upon the determinants of this probability
(Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). Assuming a no-anticipation condition with respect to
the precise date of pregnancy before the gestation period allows us to match treated and
nontreated women at this date.
The treatment group in our analysis consists of women who have their rst child
between the age of 24 and 33 and who are not retired or disabled. The control group
consists of women who did not have a child at the age of the treated mother at the
time of birth.10 Hence, we assign to each treated woman an individual-specic control
group, thereby imposing an exact alignment of the age in months. We measure both
the treatment eect and the age of the women at a monthly frequency. For the purpose
of presenting our results, we pool the month-specic treatment eects into groups (see
section 5). For example, there should be little dierence between a women who has her
rst child at 26 years and 11 months or at exactly 27 years. Our analysis estimates an
average counterfactual outcome for each treated woman based on the individual-specic
group of individuals not treated yet.
We assume that the rich set of covariates allows us to capture systematic dierences
in the propensity to have a rst child at a certain age. Specically, we assume that given
the duration of childlessness and given the covariates, having a rst birth within the next
year is random, i.e. the dynamic conditional independence assumption holds (DCIA as
discussed in Fitzenberger et al., 2013). This randomness in the exact month of birth is
9An extreme example may be a work accident of a woman which prevents her both from working and
from having a child in the future.
10We impose that the control women remain childless for at least three months after the respective age
month of birth, and we also investigate the sensitivity of the results to doing so.
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given by nature, as "conceptions are not perfectly controllable events" (Hotz and Miller,
1988, p. 91). Furthermore, we assume that the timing within the year considered, i.e. the
month of birth, is unrelated to the selection into rst birth.
The DCIA can be motivated as follows for the age range considered. Our data allow to
control for a large number of characteristics regarding education, labor market experience,
relationships, and attitudes. Note that our data are particularly rich in this regard com-
pared to administrative data used in the literature (Simonsen and Skipper, 2006; Ejrnaes
and Kunze, 2012), thus making the DCIA particularly plausible in our application. One
year before birth, the treated women are not likely to dier systematically from those
women who stay childless at least for 15 more months. The exact timing of birth cannot
be planned with certainty and may depend upon random circumstances not reected in
long-run labor market choices. It is rather implausible that women plan the exact month
of rst birth more than a year ahead.11 At the same time, women dier in their probability
to have a child within the next year and this is likely to be reected by the characteristics
that are being controlled for. Thus, controlling for these variables hopefully makes women
comparable in the probability to have a child. We argue that the DCIA is particularly
plausible during the age range of 24 to 33 years. Concerning the lower bound, at age
24, women have realized the major parts of their human capital investments and most of
them have started their labor market career. As for the upper bound, in their late 30s
it is likely that rst time mothers and childless women become less comparable. Because
the fecundity starts to drop in the 30s and giving birth becomes more risky at a higher
age, most women in their late 30s may either be determined to have a child or decide to
stay childless (i.e. the probability to have a child is close to zero).12 Thus, treated and
non-treated females are likely to become less comparable at a higher age because many
of them may act upon the anticipation as to whether and when they will have a child.
3.2 Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW)
To control the selection of treated women, we estimate a sequence of quarterly propensity
scores.13 The probability of having the rst child within the next year is modeled as
11Cristia (2008) provides a detailed and informative discussion of the inherent randomness in becoming
pregnant even when the women intends to have a child.
12Based on U.S. data, Miller (2011) argues that the decline of fecundity with age is highly nonlinear,
and is apparent primarily for pregnancies after age 33. Analogous to Miller (2011), we only consider rst
childbirths up to the mother's age of 33. For empirical descriptions of the fertility decline with age, see
e.g. Stein, 1985, p. 328 and Imthurna et al., 2008, p. 126.
13The size of the treatment sample is not sucient to go down to a monthly frequency when estimating
the propensity scores. Furthermore, we think that the selection into childbirth does not change strongly
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a function of human capital and employment history, which is particularly important if
decisions on having a child and decisions on the labor market career are taken jointly.
As sequential labor market decisions are correlated (Troske and Voicu, 2010), controlling
for past labor market career is crucial for successful matching. Moreover, we control for
status of the relationship with the partner and for the self reported importance of having
a family.14 We include covariates of the partner, such as income and education, to try to
proxy for the partner's role in the joint decision process.
Under the unconfoundedness of the treatment and perfect overlap in the propensity
score, Busso et al. (2009) conclude that in small samples with unknown propensity score,
a modied inverse probability weighting estimator (IPW) performs best in comparison to
various matching estimators. This result stands in contrast to the conclusions obtained by
the Monte Carlo study in Frolich (2004). The crucial modication of the IPW estimator
involves the normalization of weights for the nontreated women. According to the results
of Busso et al. (2009), the poor performance of IPW reported by Frolich's (2004) Monte
Carlo study is due to the fact that Frolich does not normalize the IPW weights. Doing so
strongly improves the performance of the estimator as found by Busso et al. (2009), who
suggest to estimate the ATT as follows (Busso et al., 2009, eq. (7)):
^BDM =
Pn
i=1 TiYiPn
i=1 Ti
 
Pn
j=1(1  Tj)W^jYjPn
j=1(1  Tj)W^j
(1)
with weights W^j = p^(Xj)=(1  p^(Xj)) :
Furthermore, Ti; Tj denote the treatment dummy variables for individuals i; j (treated
and non-treated), respectively, and p^(Xj) denotes the estimated propensity score as a
function of covariates Xj. The application of the weights Wj leads to a reweighting of
the nontreated women according to the odds{ratio of having a child within the next year.
Note that the denominator corresponds to the sum of the weights in the numerator.
For our application, we have to account for the fact that for the estimation of treat-
ment versus waiting, the group of eligible comparison women changes by month of age.
Correspondingly, the alignment between treated and nontreated observations changes as
well by month of age. The higher the age, the smaller the 'eligible' control group for rst
birth. Thus, we modify the estimator in equation (1) to
^ =
Pn
i=1 Ti

Yi  
Pn
j=1
(1 Tj)W^i;jYj;age(i)Pn
j=1
(1 Tj)W^i;j

Pn
i=1 Ti
(2)
from month to month.
14In fact, in contrast to matching, the reweighting estimator we will use later requires the propensity
score to be a conditional probability (Busso et al., 2009), which is evident in our application. As there
seems sucient overlap, we do not use any trimming, see Figure 3.
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with weights W^i;j = Ei;j p^(Xj)=(1  p^(Xj)) :
Ei;j is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if woman j can be used as a control
observation for treated woman i, i.e. if j remains childless for at least three months after
the respective age at rst birth for the treated woman i. Ei;j is set to zero if woman j
has a child earlier than the three months after birth for woman i. Yj;age(i) is the outcome
of control woman j aligned to the age at rst birth for treated woman i.
This IPW or reweighting estimator has the advantage of not relying on a tuning
parameter such as a bandwidth in kernel matching or the number of nearest neighbors
in nearest neighbor matching. Moreover, it is easy to implement and standard errors are
readily obtained by bootstrapping. Busso et al. (2009) show that this estimator is preferred
in terms of bias and variance in nite sample settings with unknown propensity score.
However, they stress that this only holds with good overlap and when misspecication of
the propensity score is not a concern.
3.3 Outcome regression based on IPW
In order to account for time trends and to assess eect heterogeneity by observable charac-
teristics (e.g., by age, education, time), we follow Abadie and Imbens (2011) who suggest
to estimate ex post outcome regressions after matching. We estimate weighted linear
regressions of the individual outcomes on an intercept, a treatment dummy as well as fur-
ther covariates and the interactions of their demeaned values with the treatment dummy
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 612). Because of the fairly small treatment sample, we decided
not to align the treated women and the women in the control group both by age and
year (which would be equivalent to align age and year of birth of the women). Note
that the estimated propensity score includes year dummies. Thus, the dynamic matching
approach employed matches the calendar year. All estimated treatment eects reported
in the following - including the baseline estimates without further controls - are based on
outcome regressions controlling for year dummies to account for a time trend in female
employment rates.
We adjust the approach by Abadie and Imbens to the IPW case employing a constant
weight of 1=
Pn
j=1(Tj) for a treated woman i and a weight of (1 Tj)W^i;j=
Pn
j=1(1 Tj)W^i;j
for a nontreated woman j, with outcome Yj;age(i) aligned in age for Ei;j = 1 to treated
woman i.
Specically, we run the following regression of the outcome Y after the beginning of
treatment
Yj;age =  + xj + Tj + Tj(xj   x) + uj ; (3)
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where xj denote the observable characteristics considered, i.e. educational dummies, and x
corresponds to the sample average among the treated. The outcome measurement Yi;age is
recorded once for a treated woman i and carries a weight of 1. The outcome measurement
Yj;age(i) for a nontreated woman j is recorded as many times as she can be used as a
control observation for a treated woman i (each time aligned in age to i). Each single
measurement carries the weight (1 Tj)W^i;j=Pnj=1(1 Tj)W^i;j and the weights of eligible
control observations sum up to one for each treated woman i. These regression weights
mimic the weights used in equation (1). Note that in a weighted regression (3) without
the covariates involving xj, the estimate for  would reproduce ^BDM as in equation (2).
In a weighted regression with the covariates involving xj, the estimate for  corre-
sponds to the ATT estimate, corrected for the mismatch in observable characteristics.
The coecients  control for the impact of the characteristics on the average outcome
variable. If  = 0 in regression (3), then there is no linear eect heterogeneity by the level
of covariates. The standard errors of the estimated regression coecients are obtained
from the bootstrap procedure for the IPW estimator by rerunning regression (3) for all
resamples.
4 Data
The analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a yearly
household survey interviewing all persons above the age of 15. The survey collects data
on employment related questions such as working hours, income and many more. It also
asks for many other topics such as leisure, health, satisfaction and values. Moreover,
it contains information about monthly employment status and income sources, allowing
us to analyze our research question at a monthly level. The SOEP has been used in a
number of studies on employment of mothers and the eects of maternity leave, see e.g.
Bergemann and Riphahn (2011), Sommerfeld (2009), Vogel (2009), Wrohlich (2004), or
Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000).
We use data from 1991 to 2008, because 1991 is the rst year that households from East
Germany were included in the panel. We drop pensioners, disabled persons, and those
women just under the age of 24 years, as younger women are often still in education. In
2000, the median age at rst birth was 29 years in West Germany (Potzsch, 2005). Older
women pose a problem if the selection of the control group gets too strong, as the share
of women in the control group who will have a child later decreases with age. We chose
age 33 as upper limit for this study, because fertility is rather stable until the age of 34
and declines strongly from age 35 onwards (Potzsch, 2005, Stein, 1985, p. 328, Imthurna
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et al., 2008, p. 126). Importantly, women who already have a child are excluded from the
data.
A childless woman can potentially give birth to her rst child in any month. We
therefore construct a dierent control group for every month, consisting of women without
children. The denition of non-treatment is crucial and involves the classication window
which denes treatment and control group. On the one hand, women of the control
group should not have their rst child in the near future to be able to sharply distinguish
between treatment and control group. On the other hand, the control group should be
highly comparable to the treatment group such that the probability of having a child is
similar. As a compromise, we chose a window of three months during which control group
individuals must not have their rst child.
We also have to address attrition in the data, which has to be incorporated in the
normalization of the IPW-weights. The size of the treatment and control group by age
is shown in Figure 1. For the estimation of the treatment eect it is essential to match
highly comparable women. This comparability is achieved by the exact alignment of
age (in months) as has been described earlier, and by a reweighting procedure which is
based on the propensity to have the rst child at a certain age. The required pre-birth
information is collected at least 12 months before the birth to avoid the anticipation
of the exact timing of rst birth. However, in order to use relevant information for
the time of birth, the interview should not have been too far in the past; we therefore
choose a maximum of 15 months before birth based on a window width of three months.
Reweighting on the propensity score is required to assure that the dynamic conditional
independence assumption (DCIA) holds. To capture all relevant factors which jointly
inuence fertility and labor supply, we include human capital variables (degree of schooling
and training education), pre-birth labor market history (working hours, wage, job type,
full time, part time and unemployment experience) as well as information on relationships
(partnership, marriage). In addition, we include the self-reported importance of family
for one's satisfaction as an attitudinal variable aecting the fertility decision.
[ Figure 1 about here. ]
Figure 2 shows the distribution of age at rst birth in the age range 20 to 38 years
both for all women and by education group. First childbirths for all women peak in the
age range 24-33 (the age range we consider in our analysis), but a sizeable share of rst
childbirths occurs outside of this age range. The age distribution diers considerably by
education group. The age distribution shifts to the right the higher the education level.
First childbirths peak for the low-skilled mothers in their early 20s, for the medium-skilled
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mothers in the late 20s, and for the high skilled mothers in their early 30s. Our age range
24-33 covers the vast majority of childbirths for all women and in the group of medium-
skilled women. The share is lower both for low-skilled and for high-skilled women.
[ Figure 2 about here. ]
Our outcome variable of interest is employment after rst birth. We provide some
evidence on full time and part time employment but we focus on employment as our
outcome variable of interest. Note that part time employment may be a stepping stone
towards higher working hours at a later time (Vogel, 2009; Ziee, 2004). The level of full
time employment in Germany is very low after childbirth (see e.g. Geyer and Steiner,
2007; Sommerfeld, 2009). Furthermore, there is no distinction between household work
(being out-of-labor) and job search (being unemployed) as the data do not allow us to
distinguish between these states in a reliable way. We abstract from reductions in hours
of work around the time of childbirth (Buligescu et al., 2009). Our outcome variable is
employment in each month for ve years following the birth of the rst child. Extending
the analysis to a time period beyond ve years severely reduces the sample size due to
sample attrition (results are available upon request).
5 Empirical Results
After some descriptive evidence, we discuss the estimated treatment eects and the results
of a sensitivity analysis.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics before and after IPW-matching
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics at the time of matching before ('unweighted') and after
IPW-matching ('weighted'). The probit estimates for the propensity score are displayed
in Table 3. Table 2 shows that before matching, there are some sizeable dierences in
observables between the treatment and the control group (e.g., treated women are more
often employed and live more often in a partnership). Hardly any signicant dierences
remain after matching. Thus, IPW seems to balance the observable characteristics very
well. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that there is a very good overlap in the support of the
distributions of the estimated propensity score for the treatment group and the control
group.
[ Tables 2 and 3 about here. ]
[ Figure 3 about here. ]
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Figures 4 to 6 show that with respect to the employment rate, educational degrees,
and partnership, some pre{birth dierences between treatment and control group exist
before matching (i.e. without IPW-weighting), particularly at younger ages. The highest
obtained educational degrees also dier somewhat for younger women, as some of them
are still in education.15 These gures also show that the weighting procedure works well
to improve comparability between treatment and control group at the point in time before
treatment starts. However, the employment rate of the treatment group before birth still
remains slightly higher, i.e. young rst-time mothers have a higher labor force attachment
before birth than women of the same age, but without a child.
[ Figures 4, 5, 6 and about here. ]
Figure 7 shows employment rates before and after birth, with and without reweighting
of the control group. Recall that matching takes place twelve months before treatment.
The reweighting procedure works well for the alignment of the employment rate before
birth, even though the treatment group still exhibits slightly higher rates. At birth,
employment among the treated drops to zero due to mandatory maternity leave of at
least eight weeks after the birth. Afterwards, the employment rate of rst-time mothers
recovers very slowly, while that of women in the control group decreases slightly. This is
due to the fact that these women may also drop out of employment, e.g. due to childbirth
in the future (see evidence on this below). A major concern is that the treatment group
may be negatively selected with respect to unobservables, which could be reected in the
pre-birth employment dip (see Ejrnaes and Kunze (2012) for related evidence based on
administrative data for a pre-birth earnings dip). However, this is unlikely to be a problem
in our case because the pre-birth employment dip is restricted to about six months right
before birth and because we match on the observables - including employment - twelve
months before birth. Also, note that compared to the group of all nontreated women,
our treatment group is a positive selection with respect to the employment rate during
the time period of 24 months to six months before birth. We conclude that there is no
indication that anticipation eects twelve months before birth invalidate our estimation
approach.
[ Figure 7 about here. ]
Next, we consider employment rates in full time and in part time employment for the
two groups. While there is a clear expectation that women in the treatment group will
15Recall that for the treatment eect at age 24 the training degree is measured at age 23 - an age where
some educational programs are not yet completed (particularly university).
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work much less in full time than the control group, it is not that clear what to expect
for part time work. As Figure 8 shows, the development of full time employment is as
expected. For part time work the shares are very low before rst childbirth and increase
stronlgy afterwards. While the part time employment rate of the treatment group reaches
more than 30% ve years after rst childbirth, this rate remains clearly below 20% for
the control group.
[ Figure 8 about here. ]
To shed more light on the fertility behavior in the treated group and the control group,
Figure 9 shows the rates at which women in the control group have their rst birth and at
which treated women have their second birth. It can be seen that after ve years, nearly
50% of the control observations have had their rst birth. Among the treated, nearly 60%
have had a second birth by this time.
[ Figure 9 about here. ]
5.2 Average Treatment Eect on the Treated (ATT)
Recall that we estimate the ATT of the treatment of having a rst child now versus
waiting, where waiting entails both the possibility to have child later at a higher age and
the possibility of never having a child. Figure 10 depicts the monthly ATTs on employment
outcomes during the rst ve years after rst birth. The estimates are pooled across age
groups and the condence intervals are based on 100 bootstrap replications. The estimated
ATTs are negative and persistent, implying that within the observation window of ve
years, the rst-time mothers never fully catch up to the control group. This holds even
though part time employment is also covered by our outcome variable and women in the
control group may also drop out of employment, e.g. because of childbirth. Over time, the
ATT clearly shows a strong upward trend, however, being interrupted by short periods
of decline which are due to mothers who (re)enter the labor market after childbirth, but
later drop out again.
[ Figure 10 about here. ]
At time zero, which corresponds to the month of birth, the absolute values of the ATTs
are highest just reecting the employment rate in the control group, since all treated
mothers are not allowed by law to work during the rst two months or so. The estimated
treatment eects right after birth are a kind of 'lock-in eect of childbirth', analogous
to lock-in eects in the analysis of labor market programs (Fitzenberger et al., 2013).
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During the rst year after childbirth, the ATT increases strongly from -81 percentage
points (ppoints) to around -50 ppoints. In the second year the ATT continues to catch
up, reaching -30 ppoints. Three years after birth we observe an upward jump in the
ATT to -20 ppoints, which is due to the institutional changes that occur at this point
in time (recall the job protection period and childcare availability). Still, this jump after
three years is small. Afterwards, the negative employment eect remains fairly constant,
reaching around -20 ppoints after ve years. Our key nding is the large and persistent
negative employment loss after rst childbirth which does not level o completely within
ve years. Distinguishing between full time and part time employment, Figure 8 implies a
positive eect of rst childbirth on part time employment and a negative eect on fulltime
employment. Thus, the employment loss implied by childbirth is fully explained by the
loss in fulltime employment.
Figure 10 also shows employment eects before childbirth. Note that we align treated
and nontreated women 12 months before birth. Consequently, there is no signicant
employment eect two years before birth, which shows that, after matching, treated and
nontreated women are well matched with regard to their employment history. Right
before birth, there is a small negative employment eect, which we denote as a lock-in-
eect caused by the pregnancy { in analogy to the training literature. The future mothers
start to reduce their labor supply. Note that our matching approach does not allow
matched women in the control group to have their rst child during the rst three months
after childbirth by the respective treated mother. Therefore, the control group is locked
into non-treatment during this period, which is associated with a higher employment rate
compared to women who have a child soon after the treated women.
Next, we discuss the employment eects by age groups to investigate whether delaying
the rst birth leads to distinct results. Recall that our estimation approach does not allow
us to infer causal eects of delaying childbirth. Here, we simply compare the estimated
ATT employment eects across age groups based on the dierent groups of treated women
having a rst child at a dierent age. The selection of these treated women may change
over time. Because it is likely that the foregone earnings when not working are growing
with age, we would expect the employment loss to fall with age. However, a changing
selection of treated women by age may result in a dierent age pattern.
Figure 11 plots the ATT employment eects by two-year age groups, averaging treatment-
control dierences among rst-time mothers in the age group. The estimated ATTs are
always negative and show similar patterns as the ones for the pooled results. Note that
this similarity holds although older women show higher employment rates than younger
ones in both the treatment and the control group. These dierences simply cancel out
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in the estimation of the ATTs. Two years after childbirth, the employment eects for
the dierent age groups start to diverge, with the oldest age group showing the strongest
negative employment eects and the youngest age group showing ATTs approaching zero
after ve years. This could be due to the fact that the average age at rst childbirth
is about 28 years, which in turn is likely to aect the behavior of the control group of
the 24{and 25{year{olds three to four years later. The dierences between the groups of
26{27, 28{29, and 30{31 year-olds are negligible. At the same time, the absolute value
of the ATT is very large for the oldest considered group. This group exhibits a clearly
stronger eect in the second and third year after birth compared to all other age groups.
One explanation for this nding could be that the utility of spending more time with the
child increases with age at childbirth, thus reecting a changing selection of mothers by
age at childbirth.
[ Figure 11 about here. ]
To understand our results, it also proves important to consider how second births in
the treatment group are distributed over the age groups. One would expect that older or
more productive groups space their births more closely (Ejrnaes and Kunze, 2012; Troske
and Voicu, 2010). The left part of Figure 12 shows that the fraction of treatment mothers
who have a second child is rather stable over the age groups up until age 30-31. However,
the kink in Figure 12 (left) means that the group of 32+33 year-old rst time mothers
displays a lower share of second births than younger mothers. The right part of Figure 12
shows that the fraction of control women who have a rst child within two years after the
treatment women is constant over age. However, what declines with age is the fraction of
control observations who have a rst child three to ve years after the matched treatment
observations.
[ Figure 12 about here. ]
Among the results obtained so far, the most striking part is the large negative em-
ployment eects for the group of 32{33 year-olds although this group displays a very high
labor force attachment before birth. This contradicts predictions derived from human
capital theory saying that the ATT should be lower for older rst-time mothers as they
have already acquired a high level of human capital through work experience. Addition-
ally, this is against the ndings of Miller (2011) and Troske and Voicu (2010) who both
nd higher labour force attachments of mothers who delay the rst birth.
Education may also aect the timing of labor market entry, career progression, and the
timing of birth. In Germany, young employees with a vocational training degree generally
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enter the labor market in their early twenties at the latest. University students typically
complete their university degree in their mid/late twenties. When highly educated women
anticipate large wage losses (as found by Wilde et al., 2010; Ejrnaes and Kunze, 2012),
it is rational for them to return to the labor market more quickly than others. For these
reasons, we expect a smaller reduction and a stronger recovery in employment rates after
birth for university graduates compared to other education groups, a prediction which
is conrmed by Figure 13. We nd that the estimated loss decreases with education.
However, these results may be aected by selection since highly educated women give
birth at higher age compared to the other two education groups (see gure 2) and their
unobserved characteristics might be dierent.
[ Figure 13 about here. ]
[ Figure 14 about here. ]
As mentioned before, career progression of young women in Germany diers largely
by education group since university graduates enter the labor market much later than the
two other education groups. Thus, for university graduates, the time span to space births
may be shorter. This raises the question whether ATTs in the oldest age groups dier by
education. Figure 15 depicts the ATTs for the three highest age groups and for women
with university degree versus women with training or apprenticeship degree (further results
are available upon request). We nd huge dierences both between and within education
groups. Women with training or apprenticeship degree exhibit the largest negative ATTs
in the oldest age group. In contrast, women with a university degree already catch up
with the control group after 15 months, when they are at least 30 years old. These results
show a notable dierence in the behavior of medium-skilled and high-skilled women in
Germany. Only for the latter group, the ndings are in line with theoretical predictions
and with U.S. ndings.
[ Figure 15 about here. ]
To summarize the magnitude of employment losses due to birth of the rst child, table
4 reports cumulative employment losses in person-months. During the rst ve years after
birth, an average of about two years (23 months or 38.5%) in employment are 'lost' due
to having a child now instead of waiting.
[ Table 4 about here. ]
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Overall, in contrast to the literature (Troske and Voicu, 2011; Miller, 2011), our results
do not provide support for the hypothesis that delayed childbirth leads to higher employ-
ment. However, one has to recall at this point that we estimate a dierent parameter.
Troske and Voicu (2011) estimate the eect of having a child versus not having a child,
where not having a child does not entail the possibility of having a child in the future.
Given that a larger share of women in the control group have a child in the near future
and given that this share is falling with age (Figure 12), we would expect a dispropor-
tionately higher employment rate in our control group at higher age compared to Troske
and Voicu (2011), according to our case of stronger negative employment eects at an
older age. The argument is supported because the negative eect is mainly driven by the
medium skilled and, in fact, for older rst-time mothers employment rates are larger in
the control group of medium skilled women compared to the control group of high skilled
women. To put this into perspective, one should note the fairly late labor market entry
of high skilled women in Germany (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (HRK), 2010).
In contrast to Troske and Voicu (2011), Miller (2011) provides IV-estimates which
only contrast mothers at dierent age at the point of childbirth, i.e. in her approach,
the control group used does not include women who do not have a child. Based on the
same argument as above, one would also expect that our results show a stronger negative
employment eect at higher age of birth compared to Miller (2011).
In addition, the characteristics of the treated individuals change with age at birth.
Strictly speaking, when employment eects vary with observable and unobservable char-
acteristics, it is not possible to compare the ATT estimates obtained for dierent age
groups because the two treatment groups are not balanced in their characteristics. It
would be possible to reweight the two groups in order to make them comparable regard-
ing observables. However, it is likely that they also dier in unobservables which would
require further assumptions and a dierent estimation approach to balance. Thus, the
dierence between our results and the literature may also be caused by dierences in the
composition of mothers by age at childbirth.
Finally, the institutional dierences between Germany and the U.S. are likely reasons
for the dierences in results. A large share of medium-skilled women in Germany take up
the three-year period of job protection implied by maternity leave coverage in Germany
and medium-skilled women tend to have their rst child at a fairly high age. These women
generally have acquired a sizeable period of job experience and the career costs associated
with rst childbirth are presumably quite high. Nevertheless, it is likely that this group of
women live in male-breadwinners partnerships for which the perceived utility of fulltime
childcare during the rst years of the child's life exceeds the utility of a return to job.
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The German tax system and maternity leave institutions strongly support this behavior.
In comparison, high-skilled women seem to be less aected by the institutional incentives
for taking long breaks from employment.
5.3 Time Trend and 2001 Reform
Now, we investigate whether the employment implied by rst childbirth falls over the
course of our observation period. Specically, we allow our ATT estimates to depend
upon a linear trend.16 Figure 16 shows that the time trend is signicantly positive (see
year specic coecients depicted in the gure to the left). The employment loss falls by
about 0.5 percentage points per calendar year during the rst year after childbirth and
by around 1.5 percentage points per calendar year afterwards. The gure to the right
shows the estimated implied ATT (based on observable characteristics of all treated) for a
childbirth in the year 1993 and a childbirth in the year 2003. Over the course of ten years
the employment loss during the fth year after childbirth falls from about 40 percent to
about 20 percent. There is an apparent trend towards a reduction of the employment
loss implied by the birth of a rst child reecting a continuous change in the behavior of
rst-time mothers during the 1990s and 2000s. This may reect changing social norms
towards employment of mothers of young children.
[ Figure 16 about here. ]
We also investigate whether we can nd a signicant eect of the policy reform in 2001,
whose intention was to increase the employment of mothers after birth. As described in
section 2, parents were now allowed to work up to 30 instead of 19 hours per week while
being in parental leave. They were additionally given the choice to either claim higher
parental leave benets over the period of 12 months, or to claim a lower benet paid over
a longer period of 24 months. Furthermore, full time workers were entitled to switch to
part time work within their jobs, a change which was however not limited to parents only
(the title of the new law was "Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz"). These legal changes were
introduced at the same time and we will therefore estimate their joint eect on the ATT
of rst birth on employment from 2001 onwards after having accounted for a linear time
trend in the treatment eect. Due to a small sample size, we cannot evaluate the policy
reform by using a regression discontinuity design.
16The time trend is measured by interactions of dummy variables for years since birth with calendar
year of observation. The sample size is insucient to use interactions at the monthly frequency.
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The reform eect is estimated by means of regression (3) interacting dummy variables
for years since birth with a dummy variable for the time period starting in 2001.17 We
nd that the reform eect is insignicant (detailed results are not reported here, but
they are available upon request). Thus, we do not nd a signicant eect of the reform
itself. Rather, it seems that the reform accommodates a general trend towards higher
employment after rst birth.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check the sensitivity and robustness of our results and to analyze the main
determinants of our results, we now discuss some alternative estimates for comparison.
First, we implement the dynamic approach outlined in section 3.1, but without inverse
probability weighting (section 3.2), i.e. we only align mothers and not-yet-mothers by age
at childbirth and then contrast mean employment rates by age of the child, see Figure
17. Despite small changes, the qualitative results remain unchanged. Thus, selection
on observables (as observed twelve months before birth), apart from age and not having
had a child until the date of birth, apparently is not important for the estimation of
the treatment eect. This surprising result deserves some further discussion. Our data
include detailed information on the partner of the women and on subjective attitudes
towards family. It is because of the availability of such variables that we use the GSOEP,
which is a household survey, in the rst place as opposed to administrative data (as used
e.g. by Simonsen and Skipper (2006); Ejrnaes and Kunze (2012)). Our results suggest
that age at birth is the key selection variable to control for. Ex post, our results can be in
fact be interpreted as justication for using administrative data with much larger sample
sizes but with little or no information about the household context and no information
about attitudes.
[ Figure 17 about here. ]
Second, we drop the condition that women in the control group may not have a child
within three months after the treatment group. Instead, they may now have their rst
child at any time after the treatment group. There is no discernible dierence in the
result, see Figure 18.
[ Figure 18 about here. ]
17The time trend is measured by interactions of dummy variables for years since birth with year of
observation minus mean year of all observed rst births (i.e. 2000).
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The third sensitivty check relates to the previous one: we vary the control group by
using only soon-to-be-mothers (conceptually similar to Miller, 2011; Wilde et al., 2010)
and by using only childless women (conceptually similar to Troske and Voicu 2010, 2011).
Note that this means conditioning on future outcomes (Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008).
Specically, we rst use as control group only women who give rst birth between 3 and 24
months after the respective treated woman has had her rst child. The second alternative
control group only consists of women who do not give birth to a child within 5 years after
the childbirth of the respective treated woman. The results are presented in Figure 19.
For the rst case, a lock-in eect of 12 months shortly after birth is observed. During
the second year there is a slightly positive eect of up to 11 ppoints. Afterwards, no
signicant eect can be observed. This means that the treatment and the control group
exhibit similar employment rates in the long-run. For the second case, the pattern looks
similar to the overall ATT, but the negative eect stays above 40 ppoints until the end of
the observation period. Here, women who never have children probably drive the result.
[ Figure 19 about here. ]
Fourth, we use a dierent selection of the treatment group to check the sensitivity of
results. Figure 20 excludes all women from the treatment group who have a second child
during the observation period of ve years. We nd that the employment loss gradually
declines and becomes zero after ve years. Although this denition of the treatment
group conditions on future outcomes, the results suggest that the remaining signicant
employment loss after ve years reported in section 5.2 is driven by the fact that many
mothers have a second child during the rst ve years after rst childbirth.
[ Figure 20 about here. ]
Last but not least, we investigate as to whether the results are sensitive to panel
attrition. Figure 21 limits the sample to those women who are still observed in the data 5
years after rst childbirth by the respective treated woman. Constrasting Figures 10 and
21, it is quite reassuring that the results do not change in a substantive way.
[ Figure 21 about here. ]
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6 Conclusions
Between age 20 and age 40, women have to jointly take crucial career and fertility de-
cisions. The impact of childbirth on career outcomes varies greatly with human capital
and, thus, with age. The literature suggests that delaying the rst childbirth pays o by
faster career progression. This paper studies the eect of having a rst child at a certain
age against the alternative of delaying rst childbirth at that age on subsequent employ-
ment. To address this question, we start from the individual decision whether to have
the rst child now or wait. This is modeled in a dynamic treatment eects framework
in analogy to Sianesi (2004, 2008) and Fitzenberger et al. (2013). We match treated and
controls using inverse probability weighting (IPW) with weights normalized to sum up to
one (Busso et al., 2009). Finally, using ex-post outcome regressions as discussed in Abadie
and Imbens (2011) we analyze eect heterogeneity by education group, age, and time.
Our results involve large and persistent negative causal eects of rst childbirth on
subsequent employment. Although the employment loss is reduced over the course of
the rst ve years following childbirth, the overall treatment eects do not level o to
zero at the end of that period, i.e. the employment rates of the treatment group do not
catch up completely to the control group. In other words, and in accordance with the
bulk of the literature, having a child causes a sizeable employment loss. Furthermore, our
ndings indicate that university graduates face signicantly smaller employment losses
after childbirth compared to other education groups, a nding which is in line with human
capital theory. The strong negative eects for the oldest considered age group of 32{33
year-olds is mainly driven by an even stronger negative eect of medium educated women.
It contradicts expectations from human capital theory according to which these women
face high opportunity costs of leaving the labor market. Medium-skilled women seem to
take long leaves from employment { a point which has become a policy concern in times
of labor shortages as a result of demographic change. Additional results show that there
is an apparent trend towards a reduction of the employment loss implied by the birth of a
rst child reecting a continuous change in the behavior of rst-time mothers during the
1990s and 2000s. Contrasting births in 1993 and 2003, the employment loss during the
fth year after childbirth falls from about 40 percent to about 20 percent.
Our analysis conducts a number of sensitivity checks. We nd that selection on ob-
servables, apart from age and not having had a child until the date of birth, apparently
is not important for the estimation of the treatment eect. Rather, age at rst childbirth
is the key selection variable to control for. Furthermore, the qualitative pattern of our
results are driven by the employment pattern of those women in the control group who
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do not have a child within the rst ve years after rst childbirth of the treated women,
and the persistent negative employment eect after ve years is driven by those treated
women who have a second child during the rst ve years after rst childbirth. Our results
are unaected by excluding as controls mothers who give birth within three months after
the birth considered as treatment. We conclude that anticipation eects do not invalidate
our results.
By and large, our results do not provide support for the hypothesis that delayed child-
birth leads to higher employment, which some of the literature nds evidence for (Troske
and Voicu, 2011; Miller, 2011). However, one has to emphasize that we estimate a dierent
parameter than these studies. Specically, we contrast the age specic employment eects
of rst child birth now versus waiting, while (Troske and Voicu, 2011) and Miller (2011)
estimate the causal eect of delaying child birth. Finally, we note that in a time period
of increasing female labor market participation, huge investments in formal childcare for
young children, various policy reforms, and increasing employer eorts supporting work
life balance, employment losses of women associated with rst childbirth are still huge
in Germany, especially for the medium-skilled. Therefore, policy should pay particular
attention to this group, which involves the majority of women. More research is necessary
to scrutinize the mechanisms behind our ndings.
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Appendix
Table 1: Child allowance by birth order in Euro
Year 1st child 2nd child 3rd child Higher parity
1992 - 1995 35.79 66.47 112.48 122.71
1996 102.26 102.26 153.39 178.95
1997 - 1998 112.48 112.48 153.39 178.95
1999 127.82 127.82 153.39 178.95
2000 - 2001 138.05 138.05 153.39 178.95
2002 - 2008 154.00 154.00 154.00 179.00
Table 2: Characteristics at time of matching, i.e. 1 year before birth
Treatment group Control group
Unweighted IPW-weighted
Value [CI] Value [CI] Value [CI]
Outcome-variable: Employed 82.4% [79.0 ; 85.8] 73.2% [72.0 ; 74.4] 80.7% [78.8 ; 82.6]
Wage 9.98 [9.59 ; 10.38] 9.32 [9.06 ; 9.57] 9.51 [9.14 ; 9.85]
Working hours 35.3 [34.0 ; 36.6] 31.7 [31.2 ; 32.2] 34.8 [33.8 ; 35.9]
Part time 7.8% [5.2 ; 10.5] 9.9% [9.1 ; 10.6] 7.0% [5.2 ; 8.8]
Job status:
Not employed 7.2% [5.4 ; 9.1] 6.3 % [5.6 ; 7.0] 6.7% [5.4 ; 8.1]
In Training 5.9% [3.7 ; 8.0] 15.6% [14.5 ; 16.6] 8.5% [7.0 ; 9.4]
Blue collar 11.9% [9.0 ; 14.7] 9.7% [8.8 ; 10.6] 12.5% [10.0 ; 15.0]
Self-employed 2.6% [1.2 ; 3.9] 2.8% [2.1 ; 3.4] 2.4% [1.3 ; 3.5]
White collar 64.9% [60.4 ; 69.4] 60.2% [58.5 ; 61.8] 63.1% [60.4 ; 66.3]
Civil servant 7.6% [5.1 ; 10.1] 5.5% [4.7 ; 6.2] 6.8% [5.2 ; 8.5]
Work experience (in years) in...
... Full time 5.16 [4.87 ; 5.45] 4.18 [4.05 ; 4.32] 4.92 [4.71 ; 5.13]
... Part time 0.68 [0.54 ; 0.83] 0.83 [0.76 ; 0.90] 0.64 [0.56 ; 0.72]
... Unemployment 0.29 [0.23 ; 0.35] 0.33 [0.29 ; 0.37] 0.28 [0.24 ; 0.33]
Education:
University degree 16.4% [13.2 ; 19.6] 15.8% [14.5 ; 17.1] 14.5% [12.2 ; 16.9]
Training degree 66.1% [62.4 ; 69.9] 58.5% [56.6 ; 60.4] 65.3% [61.9 ; 68.6]
No degree 10.6% [7.9 ; 13.4] 9.0% [7.8 ; 10.2] 12.2% [10.0 ; 14.5]
Currently in education 6.8% [4.6 ; 9.1] 16.7% [15.6 ; 17.9] 7.9% [6.5 ; 9.4]
Currently in partnership 85.6% [82.3 ; 88.8] 73.7% [72.5 ; 75.0] 85.9% [83.8 ; 87.9]
Partner info missing (no partner) 25.9% [21.9 ; 29.9] 57.8% [56.0 ; 59.7] 25.2% [22.7 ; 27.9]
Partner's earnings in Euro 1749 [1600 ; 1898] 954 [903 ; 1005] 1734 [1616 ; 1844]
Importance of family...
... very high 48.2% [44.1 ; 52.2] 42.5% [40.5 ; 44.5] 47.9% [44.6 ; 51.2]
... high 8.7% [6.2 ; 11.2] 13.5% [12.1 ; 14.8] 9.0% [7.1 ; 10.8]
... low or very low 0.4% [-0.2 ; 0.9] 1.7% [0.6 ; 2.8] 0.3% [-0.1 ; 0.7]
... missing 42.8% [38.5 ; 47.1] 42.3% [40.5 ; 44.1] 42.8% [39.4 ; 46.2]
Number of observations 818 106,057 106,057
Note: Percentage values refer to Dummy variables.
Note: CI denotes the condence interval which is based on 100 bootstrap replications.
 Note that control observations have been replicated for technical reasons.
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Table 3: Probit regression results for having rst child next year
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.) Signicance
Wage -0.001 (0.003)
Actual working hours 0.002 (0.002)
Part time -0.048 (0.070)
Blue collar 0.038 (0.049)
Self-employed 0.118 (0.110)
Civil servant 0.102 (0.066)
Employer mainly publicly owned 0.011 (0.046)
Experience full time 0.007 (0.073)
Experience part time -0.067 (0.116)
Experience unemployment 0.213 (0.199)
Experience full time squared 0.000 (0.002)
Experience part time squared -0.002 (0.003)
Experience unemployment squared 0.002 (0.008)
No training degree 0.159 (0.435)
University degree -0.652 (0.514)
In education (or educational info missing) -0.108 (0.062) 
Living in East -0.063 (0.178)
Partnership -0.197 (0.051) 
Partner's age -0.039 (0.027) 
Partner's age squared 0.000 (0.000)
Age dierence 0.059 (0.012) 
Partner high education 0.396 (0.289)
Partner medium education 0.407 (0.288)
Partner low education 0.395 (0.289)
Partner's gross earnings 0.000 (0.000)
Partner's earnings missing -0.028 (0.069)
No partner info -1.398 (0.560) 
Age*Importance of family very high -0.003 (0.003)
Age*Importance of family high -0.005 (0.003)
Age*Importance of family low or very low -0.014 (0.011)
No. of years since when importance of family was last asked * ...
...Importance of family very high -0.081 (0.080)
...Importance of family high -0.047 (0.137)
...Importance of family low or very low 0.146 (0.754)
...Age*Importance of family very high 0.003 (0.003)
...Age*Importance of family high 0.003 (0.005)
...Age*Importance of family low or very low -0.005 (0.028)
<Table continued on next page.>
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Table 3: Probit regression results for having rst child next year <continued>
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.) Signicance
Age 23 0.039 (0.068)
Age 24 0.102 (0.067)
Age 25 0.047 (0.073)
Age 26 0.202 (0.076) 
Age 27 0.223 (0.086) 
Age 28 0.266 (0.098) 
Age 29 0.208 (0.117) 
Age 30 0.320 (0.137) 
Age 31 0.130 (0.168)
Age 32 0.200 (0.198)
Age*Married 0.016 (0.001) 
Age*Experience full time 0.000 (0.003)
Age*Experience part time 0.003 (0.004)
Age*Experience unemployment -0.008 (0.008)
Age*No training degree -0.004 (0.017)
Age*University degree 0.024 (0.018)
Age*In education -0.005 (0.018)
After law change -0.318 (0.097) 
Unemployment rate 0.034 (0.016) 
Intercept -1.314 (0.571) **
Number of observations 45,231
Note: Year dummies, federal states, and rm size have been controlled for.
Note:  /  /  means signicance on the 10%/ 5% / 1%-level, respectively.
Note: The Pseudo-R2 is 0.0878.
35
Table 4: Cumulative employment losses (in person-months)
Pooled By Training Degree
Absolute In Percent No training Training University
After 1 year -8.71 -72.5 % -8.64 -9.20 -8.61
After 2 years -13.77 -57.4 % -14.40 -14.73 -12.76
After 3 years -17.57 -48.8 % -18.88 -18.78 -15.69
After 4 years -20.60 -42.9 % -22.14 -22.25 -16.91
After 5 years -23.10 -38.5 % -25.10 -24.98 -17.87
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Figure 1: Size of treatment (left) and control group (right), by age
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Figure 2: Age distribution at rst birth in the age range 20 to 38 years
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Figure 3: Distributions of propensity score
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Figure 4: Completed training degrees one year before birth, by age at birth
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Figure 5: Partnership one year
before birth, by age at birth
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Figure 6: Employment one year
before birth, by age at birth
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Figure 7: Employment rates before and after reweighting
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Figure 8: Employment rates by working time
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Figure 9: Childbirth rates for treatment and control group (IPW-weighted)
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Figure 10: Average Treatment Eect on the Treated (ATT)
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Figure 11: ATTs for dierent age groups
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Figure 12: Childbirth rates by age
Treatment group: Second births
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Figure 13: ATTs for dierent educational levels
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Figure 14: ATTs for dierent educational levels
Eect for mothers without training degree
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Figure 15: ATTs for age and education groups
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Figure 16: Linear time trend in ATT
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Figure 17: Sensitivity Analysis: No reweighting
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Figure 18: Sensitivity Analysis: Drop 3-months-window
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Figure 19: Sensitivity Analysis: Varying control group selection
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Figure 20: Sensitivity Analysis
No second births in treatment group
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Figure 21: Sensitivity Analysis
Only balanced panel
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